•	Approved I	For Release 2004/03/18ECRFA-RDP80M00165A082400080021-1 Fxecutive Registry 77-6697/4
		22 March 1977
	MEMORANDUM FOR	R: Director of Central Intelligence
	VIA	: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
25X1	FROM	: A/DDCI
	SUBJECT	: Your Conversation with Secretary Vance on 10 March 1977
	REFERENCE	: Memorandum For The Record dated 11 March 1977 (ER-77-6697)
25X1	previously dis	bwing is a status report on action taken on items not scussed or reported to you through other channels.  DDO has been assigned action in coordination with the DDI and the D/DCI/NI to work with to define the relationship between Assistant Secretaries of State and CIA.  Ben Evans has discussed with his counterpart in State the dissemination to us of sensitive political cables. Evans has been promised full support.
	5.	See Tab A - Prepared by the Office of the DDI.
	6.	See Tab B
	Attachments: As stated	25X1

SECRET

Item 5 - DCI 10 March Conversation with the Secretary of State

Secretary of State indicated that there are times when CIA sends studies to Congress, some of them unclassified, with foreign policy implications. Ocasionally these studies resulted in questions to the State Department from the Congress. We should work out some way to alert the State Department in advance and/or coordinate the delivery of these documents.

Background: We provide a good many documents to Committees and individual members as part of our substantive intelligence support to Congress. Last year more than 500 were provided. Attached is a list of documents transmitted from 14 January to 17 March 1977. The great bulk of these are unclassified.

Seven Committees have access to the <u>National Intelligence</u> <u>Daily</u> per arrangements with Messrs. Colby and <u>Bush</u>. On several occasions members have questioned State Department officials on an issue and cited a particular NID item.

Proposal: We probably do not want to coordinate all CIA publications going to the Hill with State. This would raise questions about our objectivity--and there continues to be some latent suspicion in Congress that intelligence sometimes is tailored to Administration policy objectives.

The  $\overline{\text{NID}}$ , the most likely source of questions State may find discomfiting, is coordinated with the Department except for items added at night. We have taken steps to exclude from the  $\overline{\text{NID}}$  the summaries of estimates addressing sensitive policy options.

We will alert State when we receive a Congressional request for a document which has possible policy implications (such requests are checked with the DCI) and on which the Department may be questioned. We also can provide State with a weekly listing of substantive intelligence documents sent to the Hill.

### Approved For Retease 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002100080021-1

DOCUMENTS SENT TO THE HILL DURING PERIOD 14 FEBRUARY-17 MARCH 1977

Recent Developments in Soviet Hard Currency Trade - 1 copy

Ruble-Dollar Ratios for Construction - 1 copy

Soviet-East European Economic Cooperation - 1 copy

The Soviet Economy: Performance in 1975 and Prospects for 1976 - 2 copies

A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and US Defense Activities, 1966-1976 - 1 copy

Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World 1975 - 7 copies

China: Marking Time in Foreign Trade - 1 copy

Outlook for Soviet Oil and Natural Gas - 1 copy

Soviet Fisheries and Maritime Aid to Less Developed Countries - 1 copy

USSR: Problems in Financing Hard Currency Trade Deficits - 1 copy

Soviet Economic Plans for 1976-80: A First Look - 1 copy

LDC Arms Purchases: 1974-75 - 1 copy

Soviet Arms to LDC - 1 copy

PRC: International Trade Handbook - 2 copies

Soviet Merchant Shipping in 1975 and Plans Through 1980 - 1 copy

Soviet Agriculture in 1976: A Preliminary View - 1 copy

<u>USSR: Some Implications of Demographic Trends for Economic Policies - 3 copies</u>

USSR: Hard Currency Trade and Payments, 1977-78 - 5 copies

Analysis of Cyclical Dynamics of Industrialized Countries - 1 copy

Estimated Soviet Spending in Rubles 70-75 - 1 copy

USSR: Northwest Atlantic Fishing Fleet Underreports Catch - 7 copies

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China Agriculture Performance in 1975 - 1 copy	
Potential Implications of World Population, Food and Climate - 1	. сору
The USSR Leadership: Party Production - 1 copy	•
Council of Ministers for Socialists of Vietnam - 1 copy	1.5
Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments - 3	opies
PRC: Timber Production and End Uses - 1 copy	
Handbook of Economic Statistics - 2 copies	
A Study of Climatological Research as it Pertains to Intelli- gence Problems - 10 copies	
Soviet Civil Defense (Secret version) - 1 copy	
OGCR FACTBOOK (Unclassified version) - 4 copies	
USSR: Impact of Recent Climate Change on Grain Production - 10	copie
PRC Handbook of Economic Indicators - 2 copies	
	•
Natural Gas - 1 copy	
Soviet Long Range Cruise Missile Systems - 1 copy	
Soviet Naval Policy and Programs and Annexes (NIE 11-15-74) - 1	сору
Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through 1980 - 1 co	
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BIOGRAPHIC REPORTS	*
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#### MAPS AND ATLASES

Compilation of world maps (1 notebook)

Map of Brazil (1)

Indian Ocean Atlas (7)

Panama maps (10)

Western Hemisphere Atlas (14) PRC Atlas (1)

#### MISCELLANEOUS

NID articles on Panama (5)

"Problems in Detecting ICBM and SLBM Accuracy" (prepared paper)

"Comparison of 1975 and 1976 Military Budgets of 17 Coffee Producing Countries" (prepared paper)

"OCR unclassified article on MAO"

Classified Statistics on "Soviet Technicians in Syria"

Data on "Size of Rhodesian Air Force"

25X1

Weekly Surveyor articles on "Soviet Thermal Developments" (2 copies)

Information on "Communist Military Aid Activity in Egypt and Syria"

25X1

DOCEX List of Unclassified CIA Publications available (1 copy)

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# Approved For Release 2004/03/16: CIA-RDP80M00165A002100080021-1 MISCELLANEOUS (continued)

Response to question about "Concentration of Soviet Forces" (followup to House Appropriations briefing)

Bicentenial Booklet (2)

Recruitment Booklet (2)

Panama Canal Shipping data (10 copies)

## Approved For Release 2004/03/45 : CIA-RDP80M00165A662100080021-1

22 March 1977

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25X1	MEMORANDUM FOR:	
	SUBJECT : Follow-up Action	
	REFERENCE: Mr. Evans' memorandum dated 15 March 1977 Paragraph 6	
25X1	I called to clarify the matter which the Secretary had raised with the DCI. I told that I had no record whatever of the State Department ever raising this issue before in this form. We discussed ways of effectively protecting each of us from being vulnerable to this kind of journalistic probing, and, I think, agreed that prior coordination was impracticable and, certainly from the point of view of the Agency, unnecessary told me that a new position, parallel in essence to that of a public affairs adviser in the geographic bureaus, has been established in his office; currently holds this function, and I think that contact with him will effectively complement the coordination we already have with State	25X <sup>2</sup> 25X <sup>2</sup>
	Department spokesman and others.	
	No further action necessary at this point.	25X′
	Andrew T. Falkiewicz	
	Assistant to the Dinector	

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD  SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary of State 10 March 1977  1. The Secretary of State requests that we have someone work with		Approved For Release 2004703/16 : CIA-RDP80M00165A <del>0</del> 02100080021-1
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- 8. I informed the Secretary of State about our meeting with the President and his indication of a strong desire to be involved in the process of establishing intelligence requirements. We both agreed this was a highly desirable thing. I agreed that we would take the lead in this by developing a draft set of priorities which we would work with both State and Defense on before taking up to the President. The Secretary and I both agreed, however, that once this had been worked out we probably would have to have a meeting with SecDef, SecState, DCI, and possibly others.
- 9. Secretary of State reported that he had received the word that CIA would be working under an NSC Directive to collect information on human rights activities around the world. I informed him that that was an erroneous interpretation of comments I had made to press the previous morning. What I said was simply that I wanted to be sure we were feeding to the President any reports of adverse reaction by free world leaders to the Administration's stand on human rights issues. I simply was indicating that I did not want the President to receive only favorable information if unfavorable information also existed. I assured the Secretary that we were not starting some new program to collect information about the way in which other countries are performing themselves in the human rights field.

cc: DDCI

D/DCI/IC

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